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Britain and the Basque Campaign of 1937: The Government, the Royal Navy, the Labour 
Party and the Press. 
 
To a large extent, the reaction of foreign powers dictated both the course and the outcome of 
the Civil War.  The policies of four of the five major protagonists, Britain, France, Germany 
and Italy were substantially influenced by hostility to the fifth, the Soviet Union.  Suspicion 
of the Soviet Union had been a major determinant of the international diplomacy of the 
Western powers since the revolution of October 1917.  The Spanish conflict was the most 
recent battle in a European civil war.  The early tolerance shown to both Hitler and Mussolini 
in the international arena was a tacit sign of approval of their policies towards the left in 
general and towards communism in particular.  During the Spanish Civil War, it became 
apparent that this British and French complaisance regarding Italian and German social 
policies was accompanied by myopia regarding Fascist and Nazi determination to alter the 
international balance of power.  Yet even when such ambitions could no longer be ignored, 
the residual sympathy for fascism of British policy-makers ensured that their first response 
would be simply to try to divert such ambitions in an anti-communist, and therefore 
Eastwards, direction.1 
 
Within that broad aim, the Conservative government adopted a general policy of 
appeasement with the primary objective of reaching a rapprochement with Fascist Italy to 
divert Mussolini from aligning with a potentially hostile Nazi Germany and Japan.  Given the 
scale of British imperial commitments, both financial and military, there would be no 
possibility of confronting all three at the same time.  These concerns fed into the policy of the 
Foreign Office and the British Cabinet towards the Spanish Civil War.  There was a 
prevailing belief, fanned by the fiercely right-wing Ambassador Sir Henry Chilton and the 
even more militantly anti-Republican Consul in Barcelona Norman King, that in Spain, the 
victory of the Popular Front in February 1936 had signified the beginning of a pre-
revolutionary crisis.  In despatch after despatch, Chilton managed to convey the impression 
that the Popular Front cabinet was the puppet of extreme left Socialists and Communists.  
The Republican Government was seen as powerless to restrain an increasingly violent 
conflict between counter-revolutionary forces and revolutionary masses.  Accordingly, the 
                                                          
1 Paul Preston, ‘The Great Civil War: European Politics, 1914-1945’ in The Oxford History of Modern Europe 
edited by Tim Blanning, (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 153-184; Julián Casanova, Europa contra Europa 
1914-1945  (Barcelona: Crítica, 2011). 
2 
 
2 
 
British Cabinet adopted a policy of tacit and benevolent neutrality towards the military 
insurgents, with the covert aim of avoiding any direct or indirect help to the legitimate 
Republican Government.2 
 
The consequent official British line on the Spanish crisis was one of Non-intervention.  This 
institutionalized hypocrisy originated in a suggestion by the French in response primarily to 
political opposition within France and, to a lesser extent, to British pressure.  On 19 July 
1936, José Giral had sent a telegram to the prime minister of the Front Populaire government 
in Paris, Leon Blum: ‘Surprised by dangerous military coup.  Beg of you to help us 
immediately with arms and aeroplanes. Fraternally yours, Giral’.  Blum’s tentative reaction 
was to help the legitimate Frente Popular government to combat the military coup.  To do so 
favoured French strategic interests.  The security of both the French Pyrenees frontier and the 
North African colonies depended on a friendly or neutral regime in Spain.  If the Spanish 
military rebels were to win, there was a serious danger of right-wing Spain establishing close 
relations with France’s enemies, Fascist Italy and the Third Reich.  Moreover, there was a 
legal basis in both French and international law for responding favourably to Giral’s request 
in that a 1935 commercial treaty between Spain and France contained a secret provision 
permitting Spain to purchase French munitions to the value of twenty million francs.  After 
consulting Yvon Delbos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edouard Daladier, the Minister of 
Defense and Pierre Cot, the Minister of Aviation, Blum hesitantly decided to go ahead.  On 
July 22, a formal and more specific request was received from Giral for twenty Potez 
bombers, fifty light machine-guns, eight Schneider artillery pieces, one thousand rifles, 
250,000 machine-gun bullets, four million cartridges, and 20,000 bombs.3 
 
The pro-rebel Spanish ambassador in Paris informed Charles Corbin, the French Ambassador 
in London, and asked him to inform the British Government about Giral’s request and 
Blum’s response.  Blum was due in London on 25 July to discuss a British-French-Belgian 
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response to the German occupation of the Rhineland.  On 22 July, as Daladier and Cot were 
arranging the shipment, Blum received an urgent phone call from Corbin.  According to a 
report from the American Ambassador to France, Jesse Straus, to the State Department, the 
British Government had asked Corbin to request that Blum come to London ahead of the 
scheduled meeting to discuss the situation with Stanley Baldwin and Anthony Eden.4  In fact, 
while Blum was in London, the matter was not raised at the tripartite conference.  However, 
Baldwin and Eden left Blum in no doubt as to their concerns.  According to Blum himself, in 
the vestibule of Claridge’s hotel, Eden, whom he trusted implicitly, asked him if he planned 
to send arms to Madrid.  When Blum confirmed that this was his intention, Eden said: ‘It’s 
your business; I ask only one thing of you, I beg of you, be cautious (C’est votre affaire, mais 
je vous demande une suele chose - soyez prudent).5   
 
If the words of Eden and/or Baldwin did not make Blum consider abandoning the 
arrangements for sending arms to Spain, dramatic events in France did.  The Spanish Military 
Attaché, Major Antonio Barroso, had leaked to the French right-wing press Blum’s positive 
response to Giral’s request.  This provoked a vicious press campaign against Blum and the 
Spanish Republic.  After a cabinet meeting on July 25, overshadowed by concerns of 
violence between left and right being provoked by events in Spain, a communiqué was issued 
to the effect that France would not deliver war matériel to Spain.  It was the beginning of a 
process over the next two weeks that led to a complete reversal of Blum’s commitment to 
helping the Spanish Republic and to the feeble compromise of Non-Intervention.  By 1 
August, the French government had decided to propose a non-intervention agreement and by 
8 August had opted for a complete arms embargo.6  
 
Although these decisions were not the result of any official ultimatum to the French 
Government authorized by either the Cabinet or the Foreign Secretary, there was no lack of 
friendly suggestions.  On 31 July, Winston Churchill wrote to Corbin the French 
Ambassador: ‘I think I ought to let you know that in my judgement the great bulk of the 
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Conservative Party are very much inclined to cheer the so-called Spanish rebels.  One of the 
greatest difficulties I meet with in trying to hold on to the old position is the German talk that 
the anti-Communist countries should stand together, I am sure if France sent aeroplanes etc to 
the present Madrid Government and the Germans and Italians pushed in from the other angle, 
the dominant forces here would be pleased with Germany and Italy, and estranged from 
France.  I hope you will not mind my writing this, which I do of course entirely on my own 
account. … I am sure that an absolutely rigid neutrality with the strongest protest against any 
breach of it is the only correct and safe course at the present time.’7    
 
On 5 August, in an effort to clarify the British position, Blum sent Admiral Darlan to speak 
with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Ernle Chatfield, about the dangers of a rebel victory in 
Spain.  Chatfield made it quite clear that the British were determined to remain totally 
neutral, a position which Darlan quickly made his own.  Returning to France, he told Blum 
that, if French intervention in Spain led to European war, France could not rely on British 
support.  This weighed heavily with Blum.8  Then, on 7 August Sir George Clerk, allegedly 
acting on his own initiative, spoke to Delbos in terms highly critical of the Madrid 
government. His words were clearly intended to make the French cabinet revise its pro-
Republican stance.  His report received the following response from the Foreign Office: 
‘Your language is approved and appears to have had good results’.  It is very likely that 
Delbos was unaware that Clerk was not speaking on behalf of the British Government.  
Certainly, Clerk’s words influenced him in the direction of caution at the cabinet meeting 
which followed and at which the decision was taken to abide by strict non-intervention.  The 
relevant press communiqué stated that the government has ‘decided unanimously not to 
intervene in any way in the internal conflict in Spain.’9 
 
Even if no explicit British pressure was applied, there can be little doubt that there were 
strong, and decisive, hints that, in the event of war, France would be left without crucial 
British support.10  It was hoped in London that if Non-intervention could be imposed, the 
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Spanish war would peter out for lack of arms and ammunition.  Accordingly, to avoid a 
lengthy process of international treaty-making, on 15 August, London and Paris exchanged 
diplomatic notes agreeing to Non-Intervention in Spain.  It was announced that a strict 
embargo on the delivery of weapons and munitions to Spain would begin as soon as the 
governments of Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union and Portugal agreed.11  
 
Like the French, the British government was committed at all costs to diminishing the risks of 
a European conflagration.  Moreover, where the Spanish war was concerned, Conservative 
decision-makers in London tended to let their class prejudices prevail over the strategic 
interests of Great Britain.  The journalist Henry Buckley was told by a British diplomat that 
‘the essential thing to remember in the case of Spain is that it is a civil conflict and that it is 
very necessary that we stand by our class’.12  This was obvious from the first.  Mussolini and 
his Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano proceeded in the confidence that Britain 
approved of their intentions.  Ciano told the French Ambassador that ‘because Portugal had 
declared its sympathy with insurgents and as the Portuguese hardly ever came out in the open 
on any matter without first being assured of British support owing to long-standing Anglo-
Portuguese alliance, Great Britain was in favour of the rebels.’13  When King Vittorio 
Emanuele learned that Mussolini was going to send aircraft to Franco, he insisted that the 
British Embassy be told.  Accordingly, on 28 July 1936, Ciano informed the British Chargé 
d’Affaires in Rome, Edward Ingram, who allegedly replied that ‘the Foreign Office had 
understood the Italian initiative in its precise significance’.14 
 
After the point of no return, all of the feedback from London reinforced the assumption that 
the British would do nothing to impede Italian help for Franco.  Even as the first Italian 
aircraft were on their way to Morocco, the Italian Chargé in London, Leonardo Vitetti, 
reported on the widespread sympathy to be found within the highest reaches of the 
Conservative Party for the Spanish rebels and for Italian fascism.  Vitetti’s conclusions 
derived from conversations with Conservative M.P.s, Captain David Margesson, the 
                                                          
11 Moradiellos, La perfidia, pp. 71-2. 
12 Henry Buckley, Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940) p. 321. 
13 Ingram to Eden, 28 July 1936, Documents on British Foreign Policy 2nd Series, Vol. XVII (London: HMSO, 
1979) pp. 31-2. 
14 Nino D’Aroma, Un popolo alla prova. Dieci anni di guerra (1935-1945) 4 vol. (Palermo, Editore Cusimano, 
1967) I, pp. 282-3; Nino D’Aroma, Vent’anni insieme: Vittorio Emanuele e Mussolini (Bologna, Editoriale 
Capelli, 1957) p. 242.  There is no evidence of this conversation in either the British or Italian diplomatic 
documents. 
6 
 
6 
 
Conservative leader of the House, with senior Tories at the Carlton Club and with 
representatives of the ultra-right-wing Rothemere press.  Tory MPs told Vitetti that the events 
in Spain were the direct consequence of ‘subversive Soviet propaganda’ and that the Spanish 
left had to be crushed.  Leo Amery, one-time First Lord of the Admiralty, told him that the 
Spanish war raised ‘the problem of the defence of Europe against the threat of bolshevism’.  
Ciano was delighted and encouraged further contacts.  Vitetti reported that British support for 
French proposals for non-intervention was based entirely on the belief that it was a useful 
device for preventing France helping the Spanish Republic.15 
 
Franco never ever admitted in public that ‘perfidious Albion’ had made an enormous 
contribution to his eventual success.  The hastily created administration created by the rebels, 
the Junta de Defensa Nacional, commissioned a series of legal reports on the international 
situation.  The first, produced on 4 August, was optimistic: ‘The general drift of the 
diplomatic situation is favourable to our movement firstly because of the overwhelming 
impetus of the totalitarian states throughout the world and secondly because even in the states 
locked in liberalism, or even in the sway of the Popular Front, there exists, in proportion to 
the danger, a nationalist reaction.  France, if not entirely hostile, is hardly favourable…, 
England is practically neutral, we have the sympathy of Portugal, Italy and Germany.’16   
Within a week a much more upbeat report was presented by the legal team declaring that 
‘Overall, the English favour us, as can be appreciated by the forthright, open and admirable 
assistance given us by Portugal, a country tied to the British to such an extent that it must be 
admitted that Oliveira Salazar has the fullest approval of the British Government in aiding us 
on the scale that he does.’17  In early August, Juan de la Cierva, the Spanish inventor of the 
autogyro (the precursor of the helicopter), who had helped arrange Franco’s flight from the 
Canary Islands to Morocco, told Vitetti that he had bought all the aircraft available on the 
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free market in Britain and was about to send them to General Mola.  De la Cierva said that 
‘the British authorities had given him every facility even though they knew only too well that 
the aircraft were destined for the Spanish rebels’.18 
 
The British were inclined by their considerable commercial interests in Spain to be hostile to 
the Republic.  The business community believed that the anarchists and other Spanish 
revolutionaries were liable to seize and collectivize British holdings.19  Equally, members of 
the British government and the diplomatic corps, for reasons of class and education, 
sympathised with the anti-revolutionary aims of the Nationalists as they did with those of 
Hitler and Mussolini.  Moreover, it was commonplace for Spanish aristocrats and the scions 
of the main sherry exporting families to be educated at English Catholic Public Schools like 
Beaumont, Downside, Ampleforth and Stonyhurst.  There was thus a nexus of upper class 
contacts and friendship which intensified the underlying hostility of British Conservatives to 
the Spanish Republic.20 Added to the determination to avoid war, these factors made the 
adoption of a policy of non-intervention a logical step.   
 
Non-Intervention was ostensibly intended to neutralise and localise the Spanish war.  
However, it hobbled the Spanish Republic far more than it did the military rebels.  The 
contradictions and deceit behind Non-Intervention were finally exposed by the humiliations 
suffered by the British government during the war in the Basque Country.  A substantial 
degree of responsibility lay with Sir Henry Chilton who was openly and unremittingly hostile 
to the government to which he was accredited.  The American Ambassador, Claude Bowers 
wrote that Chilton ‘was violently against the loyalists from the first day’.21  From his splendid 
French residence in St Jean de Luz, where he remained until his retirement in late 1937, 
Chilton maintained cordial relations with the military rebels on the Basque side of the border.  
This was particularly true of his friendship with the Carlist Major Julián Troncoso Sagredo, 
the Francoist governor of Irún.22  The information supplied by Chilton to London about what 
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was happening in the Basque Country was almost exclusively based on what he learned from 
Troncoso.23 
   
The British commitment to Non-Intervention was reiterated on 8 March 1937 when Whitehall 
secured the agreement of the other powers to the establishment of a system of land and 
maritime observers to prevent the arrival of arms and volunteers.  Great Britain would 
undertake to patrol Spain’s northern coast.  This was met with outrage in Franco’s 
headquarters where it was denounced as interference on the part of the Republic.24  Until this 
point in the war, the Royal Navy had not faced an onerous task in the Bay of Biscay but this 
was about to change dramatically.  The defeat of the rebels at the battle of Guadalajara on 
20 March 1937 had imposed on General Franco a momentous strategic volte-face.  Increasing 
evidence that the Republic was concentrating its best-trained and equipped troops in the 
centre of Spain and leaving other fronts relatively neglected led to a decision to abandon the 
obsession with Madrid and to destroy the Republic by instalments elsewhere.  By late March, 
rebel priority was being given to operations in the north aimed at the seizure of the 
armaments factories and coal, iron and steel reserves of the Basque provinces.25   
 
The establishment of the control system around the time that Franco was about to launch his 
assault on the Basque Country would seriously put to the test the British commitment to Non-
Intervention.  Franco would attempt to block the delivery of food supplies to a starving 
Bilbao which was totally dependent on sea-borne trade. Since September 1936, Vizcaya had 
been cut off from land transport from France and separated from the rest of Republican Spain 
other than Asturias and Santander.  Traditional agricultural supplies from the Levante and the 
Castilian provinces were no longer possible.  Food stocks had been depleted by the influx of 
refugees from the neighbouring Basque provinces of Guipúzcoa and Álava.  Since the 
beginning of the Francoist attack at the end of March, many civilians fled before the 
advancing rebel forces.  The population of Bilbao would soon have more than doubled as a 
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result.  By mid-April, it would be reported that bread and milk had run out and the adult 
population was living off rice and beans.26  Bilbao was entirely reliant on deliveries by sea. 
 
This changed situation would dramatically alter the responsibilities of the Royal Navy whose 
duties had so far been concentrated on evacuating refugees.  In the spring and summer of 
1937, British merchant vessels under the protection of the Royal Navy would evacuate more 
than forty-six thousand refugees, largely Basques, from Santander and the Asturian ports of 
Gijón, Avilés and Ribadesella.27  Now the determination of Franco to starve Bilbao into 
submission became an issue for London.  Lord Cranborne of the Foreign Office wrote that 
‘the Non-Intervention Agreement does not prohibit the carrying of food to Spain by ships of 
the participating countries. HMG would in fact protest against any interference on the high 
seas with British ships carrying food or other commodities, and the Navy would prevent such 
interference whenever they could.’  Most Royal Navy officers were broadly in favour of the 
military rebels.  This was largely a consequence of the slaughter when below-decks crews 
mutinied against rebel naval officers at the beginning of the war.  At the same time, an 
exception was made in the case of the Basques who were admired because it was believed 
that they hated Communists and Fascists equally.28   
 
On 30 March, The Times reported that Franco’s headquarters ‘had broadcast a warning that 
British steamers should respond quickly to any signals by insurgent warships off the coast of 
Spain’.  The newspaper went on to say that, while British merchant ships should obey within 
Spanish territorial waters, ‘the British Government are not prepared to tolerate the stopping of 
British steamers on the high seas for the purpose of search’.29  Franco’s chief of naval staff, 
Admiral Juan Cervera Valderrama, had threatened that ‘any British ship found within 
territorial waters will be seized or sunk.’  Behind the warning was the knowledge that the 
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principal suppliers of food to Bilbao were twelve merchant ships, flying under the British 
flag, that had been contracted by the Basque Government.30 
 
The first crisis took place around 5.30 a.m. on 6 April 1937.  The SS Thorpehall, a British 
cargo vessel bound for Bilbao with food supplies, sent a distress signal to HMS Brazen, one 
of the four Royal Navy destroyers of the Home Fleet patrolling the 150 miles of the North 
coast of Republican Spain.  Thorpehall’s captain reported that his ship had stopped outside 
Spanish territorial waters by the Spanish rebel armed trawler Galerna which had fired a shot 
across his bows.  Brazen’s captain, Commander Taylor, went to investigate.  While HMS 
Brazen was alongside Thorpehall, the rebel battlecruiser Almirante Cervera arrived and 
signalled that food would not be allowed to enter Bilbao.  Brazen was outgunned by the 
Spanish warship so Commander Taylor stalled and told the Thorpehall’s captain not to 
proceed.  At that point, the Brazen was reinforced by the arrival of the destroyer HMS 
Blanche whose captain, Commander Clifford Caslon, had just been made Senior Naval 
Officer North Spain.  A potentially disastrous confrontation was avoided when a German 
pocket battleship arrived and, unexpectedly, advised the two rebel warships to leave and thus 
avoid an incident with the British.  The Almirante Cervera reappeared and made some 
threatening moves towards the Thorpehall but was driven off by the combination of HMS 
Brazen,  HMS Blanche and HMS Beagle another of the four British ships patrolling the 
area.  The fourth, HMS Brilliant, was refuelling in La Coruña.  Blanche signalled to the 
Spanish battle cruiser: ‘His Majesty’s Government would not allow any action to be taken 
against British merchant ships outside of territorial waters.’  Thorpehall was then escorted to 
the limits of territorial waters.31   
 
The Thorpehall reached Bilbao safely thanks to the skill and good sense of Commanders 
Taylor and Caslon.  However, the incident raised the serious problem for the British 
Government of how the policy of Non-Intervention could be made compatible with the 
protection of British merchant shipping.  This was a problem rendered apparently intractable 
by the stance of Salamanca that such protection constituted intervention on the side of the 
Republic.  The pusillanimous manner in which the Government initially responded to the 
problem would lead to acute problems both in the House of Commons and within British 
public opinion in general.   
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The complications of the issue were exacerbated by the report on the Thorpehall incident 
sent by Commander Caslon to the Admiralty: ‘Incident of British ship Thorpehall today 6 
April is accounted for by Insurgent offensive against Bilbao and close blockade, which has 
been started to prevent supplies of any kind reaching that port in particular.  Blockade is 
effective and I consider further incidents are likely unless prevented by concentration of my 
forces for each British merchant ship, which arrives, which amounts in fact to blockade 
running by armed forces….  Alternatively I consider that (a) reinforcements are necessary.  
(b) British ships should be stopped trading to Bilbao whilst close blockade lasts.’  In fact, 
Caslon seriously overestimated the efficacy of the Francoist blockade.  Nevertheless, his two 
recommendations made sense and he sent a signal to British merchant shipping that any 
vessel approaching Bilbao should inform HMS Blanche.  On the basis of information 
supplied by Troncoso, the British Ambassador Sir Henry Chilton also wrote to London that 
‘Bilbao is now effectively blockaded by one battleship, cruiser, light cruiser and destroyer 
plus armed trawler, all of which operate outside territorial waters’ and concluded that ‘policy 
of protection of British shipping on high seas cannot be carried on in present circumstances 
affecting Bilbao’.32  
 
When the Cabinet met on 7 April, the implications of the Thorpehall incident were discussed 
at length.  Sir Samuel Hoare, the First Lord of the Admiralty, expressed concern that a 
situation had nearly occurred in which a British ship was captured by a Spanish Cruiser in the 
presence of three British Destroyers.  It was taken for granted that the rebel blockade was 
effective even though, Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pointed out 
that on the high seas General Franco was not entitled to stop ships, as he did not possess 
belligerent rights.  There was also debate as whether rebel warships had the right within 
territorial waters to impose a blockade or to sink or capture any foreign ships carrying 
foodstuffs.  A committee was appointed to discuss the matter and its conclusions were 
discussed at the Cabinet meeting of 11 April.    
 
In the meanwhile, Troncoso visited Chilton.  Acting on direct instructions from General 
Franco, he informed Chilton threateningly that, if the four British Merchant Ships currently at 
St. Jean de Luz attempted to proceed to Bilbao, they would be ‘resisted by insurgent warships 
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by all possible means even at risk of serious incident which they are most anxious to avoid.’  
He also claimed mendaciously that the Nationalist fleet had mined the approaches to Bilbao.  
Chilton asked Caslon to inform London that rebel interference could not be avoided within 
Spanish territorial waters because the Francoist were determined to prevent the entry of 
foodstuffs in order to hasten the fall of Bilbao.  In consequence, at the 11 April Cabinet 
meeting, it was decided to send both the cruiser HMS Shropshire and the battleship HMS 
Hood to the Bay of Biscay to ensure that ‘the British forces in that region might not be 
inferior to those of General Franco’.  Meanwhile, British merchant ships en route to Bilbao 
were being advised to proceed temporarily to St. Jean de Luz.   
 
At the Cabinet meeting, mealy-mouthed concerns were expressed that protection of British 
shipping might provoke Germany and Italy into abandoning Non-Intervention.  This was 
utterly hypocritical since the cabinet was already fully cognisant of the massive existing scale 
of Italo-German aid to Franco.  Even more cowardly was a discussion about requesting 
Franco to allow British ships carrying only ballast to enter Bilbao in order to leave with iron 
ore.  It was finally decided to send a message to Franco as follows: ‘We cannot recognise or 
concede belligerent rights and we cannot tolerate any interference with British shipping at 
sea. We are, however, advising our shipping that, in view of the conditions at present 
prevailing in the neighbourhood of Bilbao, they should not go into that area so long as these 
conditions continue.’  It was decided that Hoare should instruct the Naval authorities on the 
Spanish coast that ‘all Naval protection is to be withdrawn from British merchant ships which 
disregard the wishes of His Majesty’s Government that they should not proceed to the Bilbao 
area’.  Hoare duly informed to Chilton and Royal Navy warships in the Bay of Biscay of this.  
The decision was effectively based on the Francoist threats from Troncoso.  The opinion of 
the British Consul in Bilbao, Ralph Stevenson, had not been sought.33  
 
On the following day, Troncoso again visited Chilton.  He asked what would be the British 
reaction if rebel warships ‘either prevented British ships from entering Spanish territorial 
waters by manoeuvring round them or fired upon any British ship they found inside the three 
mile limit’.  Chilton was unable to answer.34  The implicitly humiliating position of the 
British Government was underlined on the same day when Pablo Azcárate, the Spanish 
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Republican Ambassador visited the Foreign Office.  Sir George Mounsey told him that ‘in 
view of the conditions prevailing in the neighbourhood of Bilbao’, British merchant vessels 
were being advised to steer clear.  Azcárate replied that the Republican Government could 
understand that there would be no protection for ships within the three-mile limit.  However, 
since the Basque Government had fortified the coast with long-range guns, ‘it would 
therefore only be necessary for British merchant ships to be assured of protection up to the 
three-mile limit as once they were within that limit they would be amply protected by the 
shore defences.’  When Mounsey reiterated the alleged dangers from rebel air attacks and 
mines, Azcárate replied: ‘this in fact meant that His Majesty’s Government were giving way 
to General Franco’s threats and admitting his right to blockade in fact, even though they 
denied it in words.’  An embarrassed Mounsey insisted that HMG’s position was simply a 
reaction to an objective situation to which Azcárate responded that this line ‘would appear to 
the Spanish Government as completely contradictory of their traditional advocacy of the 
freedom of the seas’. 35   
 
On the following day, the French Ambassador, Charles Corbin, made it clear to Eden that his 
government shared Azcárate’s dismay.  Eden had argued unconvincingly that to break 
Franco’s blockade by force would constitute an intervention on the side of the Spanish 
Republic.36  This was a view shared by the liberal press in both Britain and France and, 
needless to say by General Franco himself.  Troncoso informed Chilton on 16 April of 
Franco’s satisfaction at the position of the British Government.37      
 
The policy towards the Spanish conflict of the British Conservative Party was facilitated by 
divisions within the Labour Party.  There was a pacifist element within the party and a 
substantial Catholic element that was influenced by news about anti-clerical atrocities 
committed within the Republican zone.  The left and the unions, led by Ernest Bevin, 
favoured action to undermine the government’s policy of appeasement.  The right was 
inhibited by suspicion of Soviet military intervention in favour of the Spanish Republic.  
Accordingly, in October 1936, after initially endorsing the government’s non-intervention 
policy, the Labour Party’s principal bodies, the Parliamentary group, the executive and the 
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Trades Union Congress all called for the Spanish Republic to be granted its rights at 
international law to buy arms.  Nevertheless, the leadership of the Labour Party had little 
stomach for anything other than humanitarian assistance although numerous individuals 
volunteered to fight in the International Brigades and there were many Members of 
Parliament who were determined to change Government policy.  Outrage over the 
Government’s response to the war in the Basque Country emboldened them.38   
 
One of the most committed was the M.P. for Derby, Philip Noel-Baker, a fervent supporter of 
the Spanish Republic, who was determined to change government policy.  Already in the 
autumn of 1936, Leslie Carruthers, a fellow supporter of the League of Nations, wrote that 
Noel-Baker was ‘almost alone in the PLP [to] have handled with sincerity and courage the 
British policy in Spain’.39  Noel-Baker confessed to the former Liberal Prime Minister David 
Lloyd-George that he had ‘obsessed day and night’ about the fate of the Republic.40  Indeed, 
the influential commentator ‘Ignotus’ (the one-time editor of the Observer, James Louis 
Garvin) criticised him for speaking ‘too much in Parliament. It is monotonous to find the 
same persons chattering day after day.’  Noel-Baker campaigned in favour of the Spanish 
Republic with several international organizations but his most committed efforts could be 
seen in the House of Commons.  In this, he was encouraged by the journalist George Steer to 
make as much fuss in parliament as possible to shame the British government into modifying 
its covertly pro-Franco policy.41  Their collaboration was intense during the Francoist assault 
on Vizcaya. 
 
Linked by their mutual loathing of fascism, Noel-Baker and Steer combined to put pressure 
on the British government to stop favouring Franco’s conquest of Vizcaya.  They had been in 
touch since Steer was a student at Oxford.42  Now, they communicated via ‘letters and 
telegrams almost every day’ in a collaboration aimed at shaming Stanley Baldwin’s 
Conservative Whitehall into changing its naval policy and allowing the Royal Navy to protect 
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British ships in Spanish waters.  In different ways, Noel-Baker in Parliament and Steer in the 
press, contributed to international outrage both before and after the bombing of Gernika.  
Their efforts on behalf of refugees would impel a reluctant British government to permit 
asylum being given to 4,000 children.43  To strengthen the impact of the information being 
fed to Noel-Baker, Steer told him: ‘Don’t use my name except in private. Describe me as an 
observer in Bilbao.’  He was concerned not to be seen as a mouthpiece for the Basque 
Government 44   
 
On 31 March, the day before his opening offensive, General Mola had made his notorious 
broadcast from Vitoria aimed at spreading mass fear with a proclamation that was also 
printed in a leaflet dropped on the main towns: ‘If your submission is not immediate, I will 
raze Vizcaya to the ground, beginning with the industries of war.  I have ample means to do 
so’.45  Over the next three months, Noel-Baker and Steer worked together to counter Mola’s 
notorious threat.  Noel-Baker’s performances in parliament were largely scripted by Steer.  
This was acknowledged when he wrote: ‘your magnificent dispatches have had a great effect. 
I have never known such good journalistic work’ and confessed that, with Steer’s 
information, ‘I have tried to make trouble of every kind’.46   
 
Their first triumph would be in regard to the supply of food to Bilbao.  Needless to say, they 
did not do this alone.  Noel-Baker’s efforts were merely the most important part of a 
campaign mounted by Liberal and Labour M.P.s.  On 12 April, Sir Archibald Sinclair, the 
leader of the Liberal Party, asked in the House of Commons what the government proposed 
to do to prevent interference with British shipping to Bilbao.  The Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin responded that since Bilbao was very close to the war zone there was a constant 
threat to shipping from bombs, from aircraft and from mines laid by both sides in the 
approaches to the port.  Baldwin was effectively relying on the unsubstantiated reports from 
the pro-Franco Chilton which he, in turn, had received from Troncoso.  Accordingly, 
Baldwin declared that the Government was ‘warning British shipping that, in view of 
conditions at present prevailing in. the neighbourhood of Bilbao, they should not, for 
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practical reasons, and in view of risks against which it is at present impossible to protect 
them, go into that area so long as those conditions prevail.47 
 
Although it was not his intention, Baldwin was effectively saying that the government’s 
advice to merchant ships not to go to Bilbao would apply only as long as it was clear that 
territorial waters were dangerous.  If it could be demonstrated that there was no threat to 
British shipping within territorial waters, the government’s position would no longer be 
tenable.  Steer, Noel-Baker and others, including the Basque President José Antonio Aguirre, 
set about doing so.  In the meanwhile, there was outrage within the parliamentary opposition 
and considerable swathes of popular opinion that the world’s greatest naval power should be 
seen to be announcing that it was unable to protect British merchantmen.  Two days later, 
Clement Attlee put forward a motion ‘That this House, taking note of the statement of the 
Prime Minister on the situation at Bilbao, deplores the failure of His Majesty’s Government 
to give protection to British merchant ships on their lawful occasions.’48  
 
On 14 April, prior to the debate on Attlee’s motion, the Cabinet met and again discussed the 
Basque situation.  The Ministers gathered aware of the considerable hostile press to which 
they had been subjected.  Under the headline MR BALDWIN SURRENDERS TO 
FRANCO’S THREATS, the News Chronicle on 13 declared: ‘In effect Mr. Baldwin said 
yesterday: “British ships are to be warned against attempting to carry milk to starving Basque 
babies because a Spanish pirate has said that he will fire upon them if they do.”’49  In 
patriotic mode, the Daily Herald, under the strapline ‘FRANCO WARNS BRITISH 
FOODSHIPS, ‘KEEP AWAY – OR BE SUNK, asked rhetorically ‘Why Have a Navy?’.50  
The idea that a great sea power that once ruled the waves was giving way to a would-be 
dictators had an impact on those who would normally shy away from support for the Spanish 
Republic.  Moreover, contrary to Hoare’s insinuation that the merchant skippers were sleazy 
profiteers, David Scott of The Times humanised three of them with the nicknames David 
John ‘Potato’ Jones of the Marie Llewellyn, David ‘Ham-and-Egg’ Jones of the Sarastone 
and Owen ‘Corn-Cob’ Jones of the MacGregor.  ‘Potato’ Jones endeared himself to the 
public when he was quoted as saying ‘It makes me sick, thinking of these Spanish Dons 
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strutting about the quarter-decks of their miserable ships intimidating the British Navy and 
interfering with shipping.’51   
 
As the Cabinet met, on the table was a telegram from President Aguirre, probably drafted by 
Steer and certainly sent on his advice.  It explained in detail why the alleged blockade by the 
Francoists was based largely on bluff and constituted little threat to the safety of merchant 
shipping.  The telegram had been sent both to Whitehall and to Noel-Baker which meant that 
the information therein was in the hands of the parliamentary opposition.  Aguirre pointed out 
that there were no mines in the approaches to the port of Bilbao laid by either the rebels or 
the Basques themselves; that in the first two weeks of April there had been twenty six sailings 
in and out of the port of Bilbao without any incident within territorial waters; that powerful 
coastal batteries were able to keep the rebel fleet over fifteen miles from the shore and that, 
on 13 April, the British ship Olavus had left Bilbao without incident.  Moreover, he reminded 
the Government of the assistance given by Basque shipping to Great Britain during the Great 
War.52   
 
In response to the telegram, the ever-sinuous Hoare argued in cabinet that, in the up-coming 
debate, it would be safer to justify not protecting British shipping in terms of the danger to 
the policy of Non-Intervention rather than the danger from mines.  The Home Secretary, Sir 
John Simon, who was to lead for the Government in the debate, claimed that there was still a 
danger from mines.  In fact, as James Cable has revealed, the Admiralty had solid 
information that the entrance to Bilbao was absolutely safe.  Moreover, there was a problem 
arising from the fact that the Prime Minister had stated in the House of Commons on 12 April 
that His Majesty’s Government ‘cannot tolerate any interference with British shipping at sea’.  
It was decided that, to avoid embarrassment, it would be necessary to acknowledge that if, 
despite the Government’s advice, a ship sailing to Bilbao ‘was molested or menaced on the 
high seas and sent a signal asking for assistance, this should not be withheld’.  Eden raised 
the issue posed by Troncoso’s question to Chilton on 12 April as to the British response if the 
rebels prevented British ships from entering Spanish territorial waters or fired on them inside 
the three mile limit’.  He proposed replying that he was not prepared to give Franco any 
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undertaking to refrain from protecting British ships.53  In doing so, the government tacitly 
accepted that there was no real threat to British shipping and that was advising merchant 
ships not to go to Bilbao simply in the spirit of appeasement.   
 
In the House of Commons, on 14 April, Clement Attlee pointed out that Franco was not 
recognised as a belligerent and thus had no right in international law to declare a blockade.  
He went on to declare that the Conservative government’s action was friendly to General 
Franco: ‘and it is interesting to see what his response is. General Franco promptly sends out 
by radio a message that any British ship found in Spanish territorial waters will be seized or 
sunk. That does not seem to have provoked any response at all from the British Government. 
But the action of the British Government has provoked a very wide reaction throughout the 
world. There was widespread amazement that this country should step down from the 
position that it has always taken with regard to the right of vessels at sea, and there is 
widespread suspicion that the British Government which is prepared to take action of that 
kind must be backing General Franco.’ Later in the same debate, Noel-Baker declared: ‘I 
believe this is the first time since 1588 that British ships have been menaced by the Spanish 
fleet. As I listened to the Home Secretary explaining away our naval rights, I thought that the 
ghosts of Queen Elizabeth and Francis Drake must be stirring uneasily in our midst, as indeed 
must have been the spirit of Admiral Jellicoe.’   
 
Noel-Baker attacked what he demonstrated as the hypocrisy of the Government.   
‘In this case there has not been a single case of ships being actually bombed but a mere 
declaration by General Franco that they may be bombed. Are we going to agree to the 
indiscriminate laying of mines? We are particularly sorry that it should be at this moment that 
the British Government are taking a new step in policy, that they are allowing threats of 
menace by air, mine and ship, which did not move them earlier, to induce them now to 
prevent British food ships going to Spanish ports. For it comes exactly at moment when the 
sending of food into Bilbao is a matter of military importance. 
 
Another of those British captains quoted in the “Daily Telegraph” said: I do not think the 
Basques will surrender unless they are starved. We are sorry that this change should have 
happened now. The Spanish policy of the Government has not been notable for its luminous 
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clarity, but to-day, against the background of its murky obscurity, the Government have 
flashed out a Franco sign. We know that it is a defeat for the Foreign Secretary. We all agree 
with what he wants to do. It is with his methods that we do not agree. He spoke the other 
night of pursuing his purposes patiently and persistently. We are afraid that his policy is all 
patience and very little persistence. His whole theory in dealing with dictators is that if he 
treats them gently they may stop intervening. When are the Government going to learn from 
their own experience?’54 
 
Other members of the opposition argued powerfully that the policy of the Government 
amounted to yielding to fascist aggression which, rather than avoiding a general war, was 
likely to hasten it.  Sir Archibald Sinclair commented that the failure of the British 
Government to protect lawful merchant shipping heading for Bilbao had ‘created a feeling 
bordering on consternation in French Government circles. On the other hand, the Germans 
and Italians are jubilant. They hail it as a clear sign of weakness. Senator Farinacci, who is a 
member of the Grand Council of the Fascist party in Italy and one of the leading statesmen of 
Italy at the present time, declares: The British Government met urgently, with the intention of 
raising a loud voice against whoever dares to impose any limitation on the Union Jack. 
Instead, they had to admit that Britain could not defend her own craft in Spanish waters. That 
is the impression which has been made upon Italy. This is Abyssinia all over again, retreating 
step by step in the face of the threats of the dictators.55   
 
This point was reinforced by both James Maxton, the Independent Labour Party M.P. for 
Bridgeton and Colonel Josiah Clement Wedgewood, the Labour M.P. for Newcastle-Under-
Lyme.  Maxton compared Franco to a pirate.  Wedgewood declared: ‘The hon. Member for 
Bridgeton (Mr. Maxton) said rightly that we were feeding the dictators with what they lived 
upon. Every time England gives way and shows fear we invite a further kick in the pants, and 
we bring nearer the day of reckoning. The main support of peace to-day is fear of Great 
Britain, not contempt of Great Britain, and it is because we feel that the measures that were 
taken at the Cabinet meeting on Friday last were just one more surrender, just one more 
evidence of weakness, just one more sop to the dictators, that we are moving this Vote of 
Censure and praying that even now the Government will change their policy and show their 
                                                          
54 Daily Herald, 13 April 1937; H.C. Deb 14 April 1937, vol. 322 cc.1029-45. 
55 H.C. Deb 14 April 1937, vol. 322 cc. 1057-61. 
20 
 
20 
 
teeth. We do not want war; we want to take the only steps possible to prevent war coming.’56  
The speeches made during the censure debate of 14 April helped change public perception 
both of Government policy and also of the Basque people.  It was constantly reiterated both 
in Parliament and the press that the Basques were an independent, democratic, predominantly 
Catholic people who had helped Britain during the Great War and were now facing a 
humanitarian crisis as a result of the British Government accepting as fact the Francoist 
boasts of an effective blockade.57 
 
The information provided by Steer to Noel-Baker underlay some of the most powerful 
speeches made by the Labour and Liberal opposition during the debates in Parliament.  In 
addition, the weaknesses of the Government’s position was subjected to fierce forensic 
analysis by Sir Archibald Sinclair, Clement Attlee, the Labour MP for Hillsborough Albert 
Alexander and others.  The more potent points made in the debates in the House of Commons 
were echoed in the popular press, particularly the pro-Republican Daily Herald and the News 
Chronicle.  Reports from Bilbao exposed as false the Government’s insistence on the 
existence of an effective blockade.  Basque officials, including Santiago Aznar, the Basque 
Minister for Industry, were quoted to the effect that Basque minesweepers ensured that the 
territorial waters were clear and that coastal artillery kept rebel warships outside the three-
mile limit.58  Accordingly, the combination of the portraying the Government as cowardly in 
the face of the dictators, generating sympathy for the plight of the Basques and building up 
the merchant skippers as heroic seafarers had a significant impact on public opinion.  Much 
was made of the fact that Hewlett Johnson, the ‘red’ Dean of Canterbury sailed from Bilbao 
to St Jean de Luz without incident.59   
 
In fact, as Franco’s naval chief, Admiral Cervera, himself later admitted in his memoirs, an 
effective blockade of the Cantabrian coast was impossible.  To cover 160 nautical miles (184 
miles) in extremely inclement weather, he had at his disposal only four armed warships – the 
recently built but technologically obsolete battleship España, the battle cruiser Almirante 
Cervera, the destroyer Velasco and the minesweeper Júpiter.60  The extent to which the 
Government was hiding behind the farce of Non-Intervention to mask its tacit support for 
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Franco was revealed by the pusillanimous gesture of sending a deputation to negotiate with 
Franco. ‘The Burgos authorities will be asked to accept the good faith of the British 
Government as shown by its instructions to merchant ship owners not to enter into any 
further charters for Spanish ports’.61 
 
Aguirre’s declaration that there was no danger to British ships because the entrance to Bilbao 
was not mined and that rebel ships were not in control of Basque territorial waters was not 
forwarded by the British Government to the Royal Navy ships in the area.  This despite the 
fact that it was reported in the press and discussed in parliament.62  Moreover, the failure of 
British merchant ships to reach Bilbao was because the Royal Navy was actively trying to 
dissuade captains from breaking the blockade.  David ‘Potato’ Jones, captain of the Marie 
Llewellyn, was told by the captain of the British destroyer that escorted his ship back to St. 
Jean-de-Luz that ‘other high authorities besides those of Salamanca disapprove of blockade-
running’.  As a result, with his cargo rotting, he left St Jean de Luz on 17 April.  In the 
meanwhile, he had been portrayed in The Times on 17 April as an heroic sea-dog rather than 
the profiteering blockade runner of government rhetoric.  This would add fuel to the flames 
of public opinion disgusted with the Conservative Government.  In parliament, Sir Samuel 
Hoare was severely taken to task over the incident by David Lloyd George.63  
 
On 19 April, writing from the Basque Government offices, Steer sent a telegram to Noel-
Baker, exposing what was effectively Cervera’s bluff: ‘Coastal defences of Bilbao are as 
follows: five batteries heavy artillery mostly Vickers six-inch 1936. Range 15 miles 
beautifully placed; destroyers, submarine and armed trawlers, bombing aircraft at aerodrome 
near coast.’  He showed that the blockade did not exist in any meaningful way ‘for any power 
prepared to protect its shipping outside Spanish territorial waters’.  He went on: ‘Everybody 
here from [the] Consul downward knows that there is not slightest danger and that [the] 
blockade [is] made out of paper and exists only in [the] hopes [of] Salamanca [and the] 
imagination [of] Whitehall’.  He reported that Basque mine-sweepers had ensured that the 
approaches to Bilbao were not mined.  He further pointed out that Basque batteries of naval 
artillery with a fifteen-mile range were keeping the Nationalists at bay.  In the light of his 
information, he stated that it was ‘Quite impossible for Franco’s few ships to come within ten 
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miles of territorial waters.’  Although clearly an exaggeration in the light of various incidents 
involving Royal Navy vessels, Steer’s comment was broadly true.64   
 
This information was repeated in an article that appeared in The Times on the following day.  
Steer recounted that Ralph Stevenson, the British Consul, had visited the Presidency on 
Saturday 17 April and been given a full account of Basque measures for the protection of 
merchant shipping within the three-mile limit: ‘Five batteries of coastal artillery, mostly 
heavy guns are placed on either side of the mouth of the River Nervión in positions high 
above the sea.  There are coastal survey aeroplanes to reconnoitre for ships entering and 
leaving.  There is complete freedom from mines both inside and well outside territorial 
waters.  This is ensured every night by searchlights on either side of the Nervión and patrol 
boats varying from three at full moon to six at new moon.  Every day 16 minesweepers sweep 
the whole bay and well outside territorial waters.  These measures have prevented mine-
laying by the insurgents since January 17.  On the high seas, Bilbao can set two destroyers, 
one submarine, and half a dozen armed trawlers against the battleship España and four armed 
trawlers occasionally supplemented by the cruiser Almirante Cervera.  Still more trawlers are 
being armed here.  The Consul was informed that the blockade was no more severe than it 
had been during the last six months, that no merchant ship had yet been sunk, mined, shot at, 
or molested in the territorial waters around Bilbao, and that the Basque Government could 
not do more than repeat their guarantee that British shipping was safe in their territorial 
waters.’  Thus, Noel-Baker and therefore Attlee with whom he was in close touch, not to 
mention readers of The Times, were in possession of proof that the government was 
misleading the ships both of the Royal Navy and the merchant marine.65   
 
Then, on the night of 19 April, the S.S. Seven Seas Spray left St Jean de Luz.  Ten miles off 
the Basque coast, it was met by a British destroyer which signalled the Captain, William 
Roberts, that he entered Bilbao at his own risk and wished him good luck.  On the morning of 
20 April, Steer went out on a Basque trawler to meet the Seven Seas Spray, the first British 
ship successfully to run the gauntlet and he was aboard as it made a triumphal passage down 
the nine miles of the River Nervión that lead to Bilbao.  His moving account of the cheering 
crowds helped lead eventually to Royal Navy ships escorting subsequent food convoys.  The 
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British Government was forced to admit its mistake in claiming that the approaches to Bilbao 
were mined and issued instructions to the Royal Navy to protect British merchant shipping.66   
 
On the evening of 20 April, this information was used to great effect in the House of 
Commons by Albert Alexander, stressing that the blockade, owed to the British government 
any effectiveness that it might have.  He reminded the House that, on the previous day, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty (Hoare) had said: ‘The reports which have been received from the 
Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron, in His Majesty’s Ship ‘Hood’, read 
together with the reports received from the other authorities concerned, have confirmed the 
view that the Spanish insurgent authorities have established an effective de facto blockade of 
Bilbao.  In that debate on 19 April, tempers had risen.  Sir Archibald Sinclair asked Eden 
‘whether General Franco notified His Majesty's Ambassador at Hendaye that he would resist 
by force attempts to break his blockade of Bilbao whatever the consequences might be; and 
on what date this message was received in London?’   When Eden replied: ‘The Military 
Governor of Irun, acting on instructions from General Franco, informed Sir Henry Chilton on 
the evening of 9th April that the entrance into Bilbao of four British ships known to be lying 
in St. Jean de Luz would be resisted by insurgent warships. This information was received in 
London on the morning of 10th April.’  According to the The Times, Sir Archibald Sinclair 
was ‘white with indignation’ at Eden’s admission.67   
 
Now on 20 April, Alexander, with devastating impact, read out Steer’s telegram to Noel-
Baker: ‘I personally accompanied the ‘Seven Seas Spray’ into harbour 8.30 this morning. She 
left France suddenly 10 o’clock last night. Captain was semaphored frantically from shore to 
stop but he turned blind eye. Voyage completely uneventful. Captain’s 20-year-old Fifi slept 
like a top. Only incident was one British destroyer patrolling the Basque coast about 10 miles 
to sea feebly attempted to enforce imaginary blockade, warning Captain Roberts that he 
proceeded at his own risk. Roberts answered ‘I accept full responsibility.’ Destroyer wished 
him good luck and sheered off. No insurgent ship was ever sighted. Bilbao’s destroyers and 
armed trawlers went out to meet the ‘Seven Seas Spray’ which, since there are no mines in 
Bilbao territorial waters, was able to enter the harbour without a pilot. Large force fighting 
planes circled overhead. As boat slowly moved up river with captain and daughter on the 
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bridge huge crowds cheered, waved handkerchiefs and shouted Vivas for the English sailors 
and for Liberty.’68 
 
During that debate on 20 April, Sir Samuel Hoare was still arguing that the approaches to 
Bilbao were mined.  In attempting to defend the Government’s position, Hoare was asked by 
Colonel Wedgewood where the Government got the information on which its policy 
regarding the Basque Country. Hoare replied: ‘Our informants are the British Ambassador, 
our Consular agents and the naval authorities.’  Clement Attlee leapt on this to ask Hoare: 
‘Will the right hon. Gentleman make plain where our Ambassador, who is not living in Spain, 
gets his information from?’  Hoare revealed perhaps more than he intended when he 
responded: ‘As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there is only a bridge between him and 
Spain, and we have during all these months received a considerable volume of information 
from him.’69  It was an inadvertent admission that Government policy was being made on the 
basis of information supplied by Major Troncoso. 
 
A greatly effective device used by members of the parliamentary opposition was to argue in 
jingoistic terms that the Government’s policy towards Franco was undermining British 
prestige.  Albert Alexander had taken this line during the 20 April debate.  ‘I am convinced’, 
he said, ‘that, if a Labour Government had been in office, and had adopted a similar form of 
action in regard to a blockade of the ports of a Government more in tune with the political 
views of right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and if we had thereupon refused the effective 
protection of the British Navy for ships flying the British flag and attempting to get to those 
ports, every one of them would not only have demanded that the Labour Government in such 
circumstances should be asked to change their policy, but would have denounced them as 
enemies of their country, as cowards who would not defend their own kith and kin, as 
improvident statesmen who would not even have the sense to protect British commercial 
interests in the future, and would have demanded immediately the resignation of the Labour 
Government.’  He went on to declare vehemently: ‘Over and over again in the course of the 
foreign policy of this Government I have observed an attitude which convinces me that when 
questions arise which affect the safety of the British Commonwealth, the passage of the sea 
routes of the Empire, the whole future position of the nations gathered together within that 
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Empire—over and over again they adopt a policy which is prejudicial because they are afraid 
of even appearing to give any support to policies of the Left.’ 70 
  
The questioning of the government by Albert Alexander, David Lloyd George and others, 
using information in Steer’s telegrams and in much of the press, pushed the Cabinet into 
changing its position.  On the following day, the Cabinet again discussed, ‘in the light 
of the latest information and of a Debate in Parliament on the previous evening, the question 
of the advice to ship-owners as to voyages to Bilbao, Santander and Gijon.’  Moreover, it was 
necessary to deal with a message from the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping, which 
considered that there was no effective blockade and that the Government’s advice to ships not 
to attempt to enter Bilbao ‘involved a breach of warranty and invalidated insurance policies 
in respect of voyages to Bilbao.’  Eden, clearly influenced by the opposition and the press, 
admitted that ‘the degree of warning was excessive in present circumstances, and in that 
event the notices to shipping might have to be altered’.  Hoare was reluctant to amend the 
advice to shipping.  In the end, it was decided ‘That the policy of the Government, namely, to 
afford protection to British shipping on the high seas but not in territorial waters, should not 
be changed., but that notices to shipping and instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief 
must depend, upon the facts of the situation, which were liable to vary from day to day.’71 
 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the success of the S.S. Seven Seas Spray, it became clear that 
the British Government had been obliged to reverse its position on protection for British 
shipping.72  On 22 April, under the headline BALDWIN’S BLOCKADE, the Daily Herald 
published a stark challenge to the Government by declaring that, if advice to merchant 
shipping not to go to Bilbao was not withdrawn, it would be clear that the Cabinet was 
effectively helping the insurgents: ‘There has never been a blockade by General Franco.  
There has been a virtual blockade by Mr. Baldwin.73  That the press and the speeches of the 
parliamentary opposition had considerable effect was made starkly clear on 23 April.   
 
Three British ships carrying 8,500 tons of food, the Hamsterley, the Macgregor and the 
Stanbrook left St Jean de Luz for Bilbao.  Moreover, the captains of a further three ships 
notified Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Blake that they also intended to sail for Bilbao.  
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Accordingly, Admiral Blake signalled to the Admiralty ‘H.M.S. Hood will be there’, 
meaning that, while not offering direct escort for the food convey, he would keep his ship in 
the area lest they encounter problems with rebel warships.  The Almirante Cervera and the 
armed trawler Galerna stopped the lead ship of the convoy, the MacGregor.  The captain 
David ‘Corn Cob’ Jones signalled for assistance, and was joined by HMS Firedrake, one of 
two destroyers sailing with HMS Hood.  The captain of the Almirante Cervera demanded 
that the British warships leave on the grounds that they were in the six-mile limit that the 
rebels claimed as territorial waters. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the British 
flotilla, the Galerna fired across the bows of SS MacGregor.   
 
Admiral Blake decided to intervene and signalled MacGregor to continue on to Bilbao.  The 
captain of the Almirante Cervera responded by aiming his guns at the British warships. 
Blake ordered Hood’s own guns to be ranged against the rebel battle-cruiser as a warning.  
He signalled that he would open fire if the Spanish ships did not leave which they did.  The 
Galerna then entered Basque territorial waters and was driven off by the coastal batteries.  
The convoy was then escorted to Bilbao by Basque armed trawlers.74  On Sunday 25 April, 
two more British merchant vessels, SS Thurston and the SS Stesso reached Bilbao with food 
cargos.  Over the next few days, they were followed by the Sheaf Garth, the Backworth, the 
Sheaf Field, the Thorpehall, the Marvia, the Portelet. 75   
 
In response, Franco’s brother Nicolás sent Troncoso to protest to Chilton.  He reported that, 
an incandescent Troncoso made the absurd threat that ‘if we wanted war, we could have it.  
He then went on to say that General Franco would stop all commerce with Great Britain if 
our attitude was persisted in.  He added that commanding officer of Admiral Cervera had 
attempted suicide from mortification.’  Troncoso demanded that Franco’s Spain be afforded 
belligerent rights and also the extension of territorial waters to six miles.  There could be no 
question of belligerent rights.  Eden discussed this in cabinet on 28 April stating that ‘If 
belligerent rights were granted, our ships could be stopped on the high seas, taken into 
Spanish ports for search, and all commerce with Spain would come to an end. If we did it 
alone a difficult Parliamentary situation would be created.’  Accordingly, Eden replied to 
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Chilton on 28 April, instructing him to inform Troncoso that British policy ‘is to the effect 
that whilst unable to advise British shipping to enter Bilbao they are determined, in the event 
of British ships ignoring the warning, to give them full protection on the high seas if called 
upon to do so.’76 
 
An ironic sequel to the issue of the mining of the approaches to Bilbao took place on 30 
April.  Shortly after 8.15 a.m., while attempting to intercept a British merchant ship, the SS 
Knitsley, going to Bilbao to pick up iron ore, the Spanish destroyer Velasco received a 
distress signal from the battleship España.  The crew of the Knitsley witnessed the destroyer 
going alongside the España.  Shortly afterwards, the battleship listed to port before turning 
over and sinking stern first.  The España sank as a result of hitting a mine which had broken 
free of its moorings, a mine laid by the rebels themselves.  Needless to say, the Francoist 
authorities denied that this had been the case.  There was speculation that the warship had 
been sunk as a result of being bombed by a Republican aircraft.  However, an investigation 
by the British Admiralty, alarmed at the prospect of airborne attacks on its vessels, concluded 
that the España had indeed been sunk by a mine.77 
 
Throughout May and June Noel-Baker and Steer continued to apply diplomatic and political 
pressure to help give the Basques the best possible chance of resisting Franco’s forces.  In the 
month and a half after the bombing of Gernika, they went to great lengths, with professional 
and personal risks, to prevent a Nationalist victory.  Their principal efforts were directed 
towards trying to get aircraft for the Basque forces.  The biggest single weakness of Basque 
defence was the absence of adequate air cover over Bilbao to combat the overwhelming 
strength of the Condor Legion and the Aviazione Legionaria.  On 8 May, Steer wrote to 
Noel-Baker that ‘the depression of the militia [is] due most of all to the entire absence of 
aviation on our side.’  Promises by the Valencia government to send aircraft to Bilbao came 
to nothing in part because of the crisis that broke out on 3 May in Barcelona.  In his 8 May 
letter, Steer implored Noel-Baker to ‘do your utmost to see that planes of some sort arrive. 
The only way it can be done is through the French, through Pierre Cot, with French planes.’78   
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In fact, on that day, fifteen Spanish Republican aircraft had landed at the Air-France airfield 
at Montaudran outside Toulouse.  They were en route from Catalonia to the Basque Country.  
It was expected that sympathetic socialist employees of Air France would refuel them.  In 
fact, under pressure from the Non-Intervention Patrol Commission inspectors, they were 
obliged to return to Lérida on the following day escorted by a squadron of the French air 
force.79  In response, an indignant Steer, recalling that, in 1936, Pierre Cot, as the French 
Minister of Aviation, had covertly supplied the Republican forces with sixty aircraft, tried 
once more to mobilise Noel-Baker who had close relations with Cot through their 
collaboration in the League of Nations.  Declaring himself ‘angered by French cowardice’, 
Steer wrote sarcastically: ‘I hope you’ll be able to congratulate on my behalf Pierre Cot for 
the stoppage of the Spanish government planes at Toulouse. The fact that no planes can now 
come to Bilbao means that the town will be taken, Madrid will be next, then the whole of 
Spain. …  France will be the next place for the Fascist conspiracy, and Cot himself the next 
man for the high jump. If he acts with coolness and decision now he can turn defeat into 
victory.’  Noel-Baker could do nothing and nor could Cot who was under pressure from his 
prime minister Leon Blum to conform to Non-Intervention rules.   In consequence, he wrote 
to Lloyd-George that the resulting demoralisation of Basque troops ‘led to the abandonment 
of very good strategic positions’.80  Lloyd-George felt that Cot was not to blame, describing 
him as ‘the only man in the present French Ministry who is worth a dime.’81  On 17 May, the 
Valencia government tried again, this time sending thirty-five aircraft from Lérida.  Because 
of bad weather, half were forced to return to base and only seventeen reached Toulouse.  The 
result was virtually the same.  The French government gave permission for them to proceed 
to Bilbao after first removing their machine guns.  The Valencia government decided that this 
was pointless and ordered them to return to Lérida.  The Republican government therefore 
made the decision to send aircraft via the direct, and more dangerous, route over Francoist 
territory.   Insufficient to start with, the losses suffered en route ensured that not enough 
aircraft arrived.82    Reflecting the desperate situation, Steer wrote that ‘the fall of Bilbao is 
more than probable if new material does not arrive.’83  It took a little longer than he had 
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feared but Franco’s forces had penetrated Bilbao’s so-called ‘Iron Ring’ on 12 June and 
entered the city one week later.  The British government no longer had to manifest concern 
over such Francoist blockade as might have existed. 
 
